A Comment About a Separate Bankruptcy System by Felsenfeld, Carl
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 64 Issue 6 Article 2 
1996 
A Comment About a Separate Bankruptcy System 
Carl Felsenfeld 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Carl Felsenfeld, A Comment About a Separate Bankruptcy System, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2521 (1996). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol64/iss6/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
A Comment About a Separate Bankruptcy System 
Cover Page Footnote 
Professor, Fordham University School of Law, specializing in banking law and insolvency. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol64/iss6/2 




THE large bankruptcies of recent years involving courts of more
than one country-generally called "international bankrupt-
cies"-have led to a number of international efforts to resolve the
differences in the laws of those countries.1 If, for example, a bank-
rupt2 has assets in two countries and submits itself to the formal bank-
ruptcy procedures of both, what is the resolution if one country
imposes a formal stay3 against creditor actions and the second prohib-
its such a stay? Take another case. Assume that the laws of one coun-
try prescribe that all assets of a debtor constitute its bankruptcy estate
to be dedicated to the obligations of creditors.4 Now assume that
some of those assets are located in another country where they are
subject to a judicial lien in favor of creditors located there. The ulti-
mate resolution of questions such as these can be resolved only by
harmonizing the laws of the two countries.
A search for international harmony in bankruptcy proceedings is
ongoing. A maxim of this search is that, in general, the greater the
number of countries involved in the search, the fewer issues should be
addressed for resolution. We thus see the European Union looking
for a complete umbrella bankruptcy law to cover all member states.5
We also see the United Nations, through its private law division, the
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), starting to
* Professor, Fordham University School of Law, specializing in banking law and
insolvency.
1. Some of the current efforts include The United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law work on Cross-Border Insolvency, see Draft Legislative Provisions
on Judicial Cooperation and Access and Recognition in Cases of Cross-Border Insol-
vency, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
WG.V/WP.44 (1996), the Transnational Insolvency Project among the United States,
Canada and Mexico, see A.L.I. Transnational Insolvency Project, International State-
ment of Canadian Bankruptcy Law (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1995), and the Euro-
pean Union International Insolvency Treaty, see Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings, initialed Sept. 25, 1995 [hereinafter EU Convention] (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
2. The United States Bankruptcy Code calls a bankrupt a "debtor." 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(13) (1994).
3. A stay is a moratorium on creditor action. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994)
(defining stay in the United States Bankruptcy Code).
4. United States law purports to do this. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (1994) ("The
district court in which a [bankruptcy] case under Title 11 is commenced or is pending
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor
as of the commencement of such case...
5. See EU Convention, supra note 1.
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develop one set of rules for at least all member states of the U.N.6
UNCITRAL is attempting initially to provide only some basic princi-
ples to deal with a method for "cooperation" among courts in differ-
ent countries together with the "access" of a party to a bankruptcy in
one country to both the courts of another country and "recognition"
in those courts.7
UNCITRAL anticipates that at some future time it will be able to
provide generally acceptable rules for more than judicial cooperation,
access, and recognition as countries become more accustomed to the
process of harmonizing bankruptcy issues.8 At this point, UNCI-
TRAL does not consider itself ready for the kind of problem raised at
the beginning of this piece. One question that will be addressed
sooner or later is whether bankruptcies should be dealt with in a sepa-
rate and specialized court of bankruptcy or should be included within
the general jurisdiction of a larger court system.
Essential international harmonization can exist with different judi-
cial or administrative approaches to bankruptcy in different countries.
Substantive international cooperation need not depend on procedural
comparability. Nevertheless, as countries grow more alike in their
substantive laws, so will their procedural laws tend towards parity. Is-
sues addressed in different national court systems will, I believe, be
handled more similarly substantively if they are also handled with pro-
cedural similarity. Bankruptcy laws, both substantive and procedural,
can be substantially harmonized among countries whether they are
dealt with separately in one court system or as part of a larger judicial
structure in courts of more general jurisdiction. I believe, however,
that the structure of the judicial system will shape the results of issues
appearing before the courts. Accordingly, as the world moves closer
to international harmonization, the question as to which form of bank-
ruptcy court system is best will ultimately be addressed.
This essay examines applying the United States judicial bankruptcy
model to all nations. Part I examines the history of the United States
judicial system and the separation of the bankruptcy courts from the
courts of general jurisdiction. Part II examines the benefits of a sepa-
6. The ultimate product of UNCITRAL may, one assumes, be adopted by any
state, whether or not a UN member.
7. The words in quotations are the words regularly used in UNCITRAL. See
Report on UNCITRAL-INSOL Judicial Colloquium on Cross Border Insolvency,
Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 28th Sess.,
1022, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/413 (1995) ("The Judicial Colloquium reflected a con-
sensus view that the development by UNCITRAL of a legislative test of limited scope
(e.g., in the form of model statutory provisions facilitating judicial cooperation and
access and recognition) was both desirable and feasible.").
8. Report on UNCITRAL-INSOL Judicial Colloquium on Cross-Border Insol-
vency, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 27th
Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. AICN.9/398 (1994) ("A third possibility that might in due time
be considered for work by the Commissioning [sic] the formulation of a set of model
legislative provisions on insolvency.").
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rate bankruptcy system. This essay concludes that other nations
should adopt a separate bankruptcy system to aid in the harmoniza-
tion of international insolvency laws.
I. Ti UNITED STATES JUDICIAL SYsrM
Today, the United States is the only country with separate bank-
ruptcy courts. Since bankruptcy is a matter of federal law,9 the bank-
ruptcy courts exist within the federal judicial system. As a result of
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
these courts are established as a "unit" of the district courts10 and ex-
ist in each federal judicial district. Despite some shared jurisdiction
with the district courts" and although the judges of the bankruptcy
courts are not "real," or Article Im, judges under the Constitution,"2
they must be regarded as a separate court system with major eco-
nomic power.
No other country has such a separate bankruptcy court system.
Some countries delegate bankruptcy cases from time to time to partic-
ular judges-the delegation usually to end after some years and trans-
ferred to other judges-but none have, as the United States has, a
separate system with rules of court, clerks, official reporters, sepa-
rately designated decisions, a system of appeal, its own judges, its own
courtrooms, and all the other accouterments of courts.
At some time, representatives from different countries will proba-
bly meet together to decide whether the rest of the world should fol-
low the United States model or the United States should conform to
the overwhelming majority of systems elsewhere. I believe that (with
the arrogance long observed in the United States' approach to inter-
national efforts) subject to practicalities like an insufficiency of bank-
ruptcy cases to warrant a separate court structure, the United States
system should be the model. 3
9. The Constitution gives the power to enact laws of bankruptcy to the Congress.
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. It does not, however, take the power away from the states.
Therefore, the states may enact bankruptcy laws if Congress does not, as long as it is
within interstices left by Congressional enactment. Id Congress has, of course, had
umbrella bankruptcy laws in place since 1898 and from time to time before then. One
can reasonably assume that Congress will dominate the field of bankruptcy.
The states, pursuant to laws providing for the liquidation of insolvent estates, gen-
erally termed "Assignment for the Benefit of Creditor Laws," do have judicial struc-
tures that provide a kind of subsidiary bankruptcy coverage compatible with federal
law.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
11. The bankruptcy courts divide litigated proceedings between "core" proceed-
ings in which those courts may render decisions and "non-core" proceedings in which
the bankruptcy courts may only propose findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
12. They have neither the life tenure nor the compensation assured of no diminu-
tion required by the Constitution, Article III, § 1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153 (1994).
13. I am reminded of the opening UNCITRAL Study Group session on what ulti-
mately became the Model Law on International Credit Transfers. It was UNCI-
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Determining what judicial procedure is best to handle bankruptcy
cases has periodically been part of United States' consideration of its
bankruptcy laws. While foreign statutory history is rarely available in
the United States, the history that we do know strongly suggests that a
separate bankruptcy court has not been taken as a serious option else-
where. As far back as 1842, concern has been voiced for the adminis-
trative machinery that drives United States law. A New York
Representative then observed that "the Act was so incomplete as to
machinery, that it could hardly be executed at all.' 14
The 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 5 the first United States bankruptcy law
in the series of laws that has existed without interruption to date, actu-
ally allocated decision-making powers between district courts and
bankruptcy referees, the predecessors of today's bankruptcy judges.
These referees figured strongly in bankruptcy law history as part of
the judicial machinery.
For example, a referee was defined to "mean the referee who has
jurisdiction of the case or to whom the case has been referred."'1 6 It
was further provided that "[i]f the judge is absent from the district, or
the division of the district in which the petition is pending.., the clerk
shall forthwith refer the case to the referee.' 1 7 A later section called,
"Jurisdiction of Referees," provides that the referees had jurisdiction
to "perform such part of the duties, except as to questions arising out
of the applications of bankrupts for compositions or discharges, as are
by this Act conferred on courts of bankruptcy .... ,,
Thus, a century ago there was recognition that the burden of bank-
ruptcy cases required some extra-judicial machinery to manage the
load. The burden that the bankruptcy system has placed upon the
referees and the respect in which they were held have both grown
throughout the years.
The pure power of the bankruptcy referees apparently was difficult
for the commentators to absorb. For example, in 1956, Remington on
Bankruptcy straddled the nature of a referee's functions as follows:
A referee, under the present system, is an officer of the court with-
out independent judicial authority. His function is to facilitate the
TRAL's plan to develop a law governing principally international electronic funds
transfers. Close to the beginning of the negotiations, a representative of the United
States recommended to the assembled group that the United States had recently en-
acted Article 4A of its Uniform Commercial Code, that this had taken years of study
and that the best computer, banking, and legal minds had pooled their knowledge in
the effort. Therefore, to save a great deal of time, it was suggested that UNCITRAL
should simply adopt 4A as international law. The recommendation was barely consid-
ered. After several years of work, UNCITRAL ultimately delivered a model law
much like 4A.
14. Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 82 (1935).
15. 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
16. Ch. I, § 21, 30 Stat. 544, 545 (1898).
17. Ch. IV, § 18(0, 30 Stat. 544, 551 (1898).
18. Ch. V, § 38, 30 Stat. 544, 555 (1898).
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handling of bankruptcy cases, in which connection, after a matter is
referred to him, he acts as the court except in the relatively few
instances where the Act requires action by the judge.19
Recognizing the potency of the referee in the administration of the
bankruptcy laws, the Supreme Court by rule changed his title in 1973
from "referee" to "judge."'  The newly-constituted bankruptcy judge
was not, however, a judge in the sense that the term is used in Article
III of the Constitution. The bankruptcy judge neither holds his office
"during good Behaviour" nor receives for his services "a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office."'
The decision-making powers of the referees/judges reached their
peak in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. The 1978 Code was based
mainly upon the work of a Federal Bankruptcy Commission estab-
lished under a Joint Resolution of Congress passed in 1969. The en-
abling Resolution stressed in its Preamble that "the number of
bankruptcies in the United States has increased more than 1000 per
centum annually in the last twenty years."'  Obviously, the bur-
geoning number of cases emphasizes the district courts' need for the
bankruptcy court and its system of Bankruptcy referees/judges.
The American College of Trial Lawyers, however, stated that "the
College opposes the creation of separate specialized courts to handle
bankruptcy cases."'  Essentially, the College believed that a federal
judiciary would better be able to honor its full range of judicial duties
if it was required to deal with bankruptcy cases along with the remain-
der of its case load and not relegate bankruptcy cases to a lesser, spe-
cialized court.
The resulting law, however, was the reverse from that espoused by
the College. After receiving various opinions on the subject, Congress
not only retained the bankruptcy court but gave it more pervasive
powers under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code than it had had under the
prior Bankruptcy Act. As the Supreme Court stated:
19. 2 Harold Remington, A Treatise on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States
§ 587 (1956).
20. Northern Pipeline Coast. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54
(1982).
21. U.S. Cost. Art. III, § 1. The argument has been made and discredited that
the bankruptcy judge is an Article III judge through the powers exercised by Con-
gress in his creation. Compare Emmet J. Bondurant II, The Bankruptcy Court as a
Constitutional Court, 45 Am. Bankr. Li. 235 (1971) (arguing that the bankruptcy
court is a constitutional court) with Richard F. Bronde, The Referee in Bankruptcy as
an Article I Judge: A Reply to Mr. Bondurant, 46 Am. Bankr. LJ. 39 (1972) (refuting
Bondurant's argument).
22. S. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1969).
23. Bankruptcy Court Revision: Hearings on H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1977) (statement of Hon. Simon Rifkind).
1996] 2525
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts created by the [1978] Act
is much broader than that exercised under the former referee sys-
tem .... [T]he Act grants the new courts jurisdiction ever all "civil
proceedings arising under title 11 [the Bankruptcy title] or arising in
or related to cases under title 11." This jurisdictional grant empow-
ers bankruptcy courts to entertain a wide variety of cases involving
claims that may affect the property of the estate once a petition has
been filed under Title 11. Included within the bankruptcy courts'jurisdiction are suits to recover accounts, controversies involving ex-
empt property, actions to avoid transfers and payments as prefer-
ences or fraudulent conveyances, and causes of action owned by the
debtor at the time of the petition for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy
courts can hear claims based on state law as well as those based on
federal law.24
Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. represents one of
the few times the Supreme Court disapproved of Congressional action
in the field of bankruptcy. The Court rejected Congress' 1978 deci-
sion to give the bankruptcy judges essentially plenary-or Article
III-power, subject only to appeals, over the bankruptcy process and
instead held that an Article I judge could not exercise jurisdiction over
a purely state court cause of action.25
Congress amended the reach of the bankruptcy courts in 1984 to
comport with the jurisdictional constraints imposed by the Supreme
Court. The new law provided that, while the district courts have origi-
nal and exclusive jurisdiction of all bankruptcy cases,26 the district
courts may provide that all bankruptcy cases and all proceedings in
those cases "shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the dis-
trict.' '27 In the final analysis, the powers of the non-Article III bank-
ruptcy courts have actually diminished only slightly below those
accorded by the 1978 Act.
The 1984 enactment gave the bankruptcy courts and their bank-
ruptcy judges jurisdiction to decide what it defined as "core" pro-
ceeds, and "the legislative history of the new statute indicates that
Congress intended that 'core proceedings' would be interpreted
broadly, close to or congruent with constitutional limits. The sponsors
repeatedly said that [ninety-five] percent of the proceedings brought
before bankruptcy judges would be core proceedings. '2 The bank-
ruptcy judges, though, still not "real" or Article III judges, are a major
tributary of the federal court system that receives the bankruptcy
cases and enables the federal district courts to function as courts of
general jurisdiction.
24. Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54
(1982) (citation and footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 76, 87.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1994).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1994).
28. In re Arnold Print Works, Inc., 815 F.2d 165, 168 (1st Cir. 1987).
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With this summary of historical progress, the inevitable question is
finally reached: Is the separate bankruptcy court system desirable? It
makes little difference to the rest of the world whether the United
States deals with referees or judges or with power under Article I or
Article III. These uniquely American issues will be present in the
much broader context of whether bankruptcy is better handled in a
separate bankruptcy court or as part of the case load of a court of
general jurisdiction.
II. THE BENEFITS OF A SEPARATE BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW
Bankruptcy law represents a concentrated body of knowledge
whose issues can logically be dealt with in a separate court. The
United States has become accustomed to this separate judicial struc-
ture and accepts it almost without question. As bankruptcy matters
regularly come before Congress for legislative resolution (as, for ex-
ample, Congress ponders whether the wasteful machinery of Chapter
11 is worth the delay, expense, and inequity), no serious proposal ex-
ists any longer that the United States dismantle the bankruptcy court
system. With this confidence, I propose imposing it, through the inter-
national negotiation processes described above, upon the rest of the
world. I also ask the question of whether the concentration of infor-
mation in the bankruptcy courts has the disadvantages noted in the
past that counterbalance the advantages.
To the extent that bankruptcy judges are specialists in bankruptcy
law, one may fear that their knowledge of other laws might wither and
their bankruptcy decisions suffer from not partaking of wider and
more extensive doctrines of other law. The American College of Trial
Lawyers pressed, and lost, this argument in the debates leading to the
1978 Code.
American experience has demonstrated that the objection asserts
too much. Bankruptcy law is hardly a limited field. While it does re-
volve around certain principles, it partakes of virtually a limitless view
of the law; everything from securities and antitrust issues on through
doctrines of negligence and even into matrimonial issues. A bank-
ruptcy judge is not limited to bankruptcy alone and is expected to de-
velop expertise in different areas of law connected to bankruptcy.
Conversely, other judges with more general jurisdiction can deal
with their various fields without the endless economic distractions and
specialized requirements of the bankruptcy laws. This is particularly
true of United States federal courts, the fundamental protectors of our
liberties under the Constitution. These other federal judges will be
better judges, better able to deal with the issues of freedom of speech
and assembly, rights of religion, habeus corpus and freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures if their work is undiluted by the sep-
arate, essentially economic and numerically vast issues of bankruptcy.
1996] 2527
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The separate court structure has also served as a focus to make the
administration of bankruptcy cases more responsive to the needs of
the system. Between 1984 and 1992, the number of bankruptcy cases
filed has more than tripled, 9 while the number of bankruptcy judges
has increased by only a third. The separation of bankruptcy cases
from the remainder of the federal court caseload has enabled the spe-
cialized bankruptcy bar to cope with the increased load. Among other
things, the 1991 Judicial Conference approved an empirical case-
weight system for evaluating bankruptcy judgeship needsI This has
resulted in judicial districts with the greatest needs to obtain the great-
est number of new judges. Such an adaptation of fulfillment to needs
would have been impossible without a separate identification of bank-
ruptcy cases.
Similarly, plans for the future of bankruptcy litigation are being
shaped with regard to the operation of the separate court system.
While there is no thought of abolishing the separate bankruptcy court,
considerable thought has been given to making that court more effi-
cient. For example, a complete Article I non-"judge"/judge trial court
from which appeal lies to an Article III judge appellate court is one of
the schemes under consideration. 1 Whether a revised system of
bankruptcy court will ever evolve is speculative. What is clear is that
this kind of thinking could only exist in the distinct bankruptcy system
of the United States.
As bankruptcy laws develop a commonality among countries, the
interpretation and application of those laws will likewise have a com-
mon foundation strengthened to the extent that interpretation and ap-
plication are by a continuing, segregated group of judges. A common
understanding will develop in the international judiciary as has devel-
oped in the American bankruptcy bench. For example, the interna-
tional judiciary may jointly examine such questions as whether a
transfer into exempt assets before bankruptcy is a legitimate consumer
act of a fraud on the system, whether the recipient of a fraudulent
transfer has taken in good faith, or whether an illegal bargain should
be enforced in bankruptcy. The law will better develop its "life" so
well understood by Justice Holmes, but now on an international
stage.32
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if bankruptcy courts are es-
tablished internationally separate from other court systems, the bank-
ruptcy judges will inevitably develop an international camaraderie, as
already happens with lawyers in common fields. This carries great po-
29. Lloyd D. George, From Orphan to Maturity: The Development of the Bank-
ruptcy System During L. Ralph Mecham's Tenure as Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, 44 Am. L. Rev. 1491, 1499 (1995).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1500.
32. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1938).
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tential for harmonization of international insolvency law. Courts in
different countries working compatibly-whether formally or infor-
mally-are best able to resolve differences of great complexity. Thus,
I commend the United States bankruptcy system to the rest of the
world.

